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[Vol. 83:237 now agree that the Second Amendment originally referred to the right of the individual.! Indeed. the fact that the collective right theory was once so confidently advanced by gun control enthusiasts 2 is on its way down the collective mem· ory hole as though it had never been asserted. With its demise, the intellec tual debate over the original meaning of the Second Amendment has turned in a different direction. Although now conceding that the right to keep and bear anns indeed belongs to individuals rather than to states, almost without missing a beat, gun control enthusiasts now claim with equal assurance that the individual right to bear anns was somehow "conditioned" in its exercise on participation in an organized militia.
The "militia-conditioned individual right" theory represents an advance for the anti-gun-rights position. It obviates (a) the copious evidence. both direct and circumstantial. that "the right to keep and bear arms" belonged to individuals ) and (b) the lack of any direct evidence that the Second Amendment protected some sort of a never-very-well-specified power of states, while (c) allowing opponents of gun rights to maintain, as they did with the "collective right" theory. that the Second Amendment is irrelevant to the constitutionality of modem gun laws. But is the theory supported by the available evidence?
The latest to make this historical claim are Richard Uviller and William ]09, 408 (1998) (asserting that "to the extent original intent matters, the hidden history of the Second Amendment strongly supports the collective rights position").
]. For a succinct summary of this evidence, which has been developed by scholars over the past 4. UVtLLER & MERKEL, supro note I, at 2] ("From the text as well as a fair understanding of the contemporary ethic regarding arms and liberty, it seems to us overwhelmingly evident that the principal purpose of the Amendment was to secure a pewnal, individual entitlement to the possession and use of arms.").
5. M at ] I ("To return to our central theme, then, the individual right to keep and bear anns that is secured in the Second Amendment in our analysis is a right without application outside the context of service in state or federal militia."), words, "historical developments have altered a vital condition for the articulated right to keep and bear anns. ' , 6 In this Essay. I will comment briefly on the authors' interpretive methodology before moving on to discuss specific problems with their effort to interpret the Second Amendment. One of the peculiarities of the modem debate over the Second Amendment is its single-minded preoccupation with the issue of original meaning or original intent. This is odd because, to my knowledge, none of the right-limiting theorists are themselves originalists, and consequently they would surely not limit, for example, their interpreta tion of the First Amendment by its original meaning. But as the modem aca demic debate over the Second Amendment is entirely a historical one, in this Essay I limit my attention to this issue.
I will confine myself to evidence, some previously unconsidered in this debate, that specifically disproves that the Second Amendment protected a militia-conditioned individual right. I do not reiterate here the other direct and circumstantial evidence that supports an individual, as opposed to a "collective," right, but the full strength of the individual-right position cannot fully be appreciated without taking that evidence into account. 7
L
The Authors' Originalism Uviller and Merkel (hereinafter "the authors") are to be commended for explicitly discussing their method of interpretation.s Few law professors and even fewer historians so much as attempt this. Unfortunately, I found their discussion of interpretation rather confused. Increasingly, originalists like myself focus entirely on the original meaning of the text-the meaning that a reasonable speaker of the language would have attached to the words at the time of the text's enactment.9 What did "militia" mean in 179 I? Or "well regulated" or "arms" or "bear" or "right" or "the people"? Of course, speak ers then, like speakers today, would be influenced by the context in which a particular word or phrase is used. For example, because of the context of the Second Amendment, we can be quite sure that the term "arms" refers to weapons, not the appendages to which our hands are attached.
Discerning the original public meaning of the text requires an examination of linguistic usage among those who wrote and ratified the text as well as the general public to whom the Constitution was addressed.
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Evidence of specialized meaning or intent by framers or ratifiers is only relevant if it is shown that such specialized meaning would have been known and assumed by a member of the general public. Where more than one con temporary meaning is identified, it becomes necessary to establish which meaning was dominant. Any such historical claim is an empirical one that requires actual evidence of usage to substantiate. If possible, one should un dertake a quantitative assessment to distinguish Donnal from abnormal usage. IO Of course, once discerned, the original public meaning of the .text, like the public meaning of laws enacted yesterday, must be applied to the fa cts of particular cases. Though general language of the sort used in the Constitution may exclude many possible outcomes, often it does not dictate a unique result, thus leaving to those actors that apply original meaning to par ticular cases and controversies considerable discretion in developing legal doctrines. This activity of applying meaning to cases by means ofintennedi ary doctrines is better described as constitutional cons/nlclion, rather than as interpretation of text. ll The need for construction is Ihe unavoidable cost of using language, especially general abstract language, to guide behavior. On the other hand, the benefit of general language is that, even with no devialion from its original meaning, it can last a very long time without becoming anti quated.
Sometimes it sounds like the authors are endorsing an original-public meaning approach, but that is not what they practice. In particular, the au thors present very little evidence of the public meaning of the words used in the Constitution and, where disagreement exists, little quantitative evidence by which to distinguish dominant from deviant meaning. They seem instead to be searching for what is better described as original intent, rather than original meaning.
Those originalists who fa vor original intent want to fill the gaps in the original public meaning and cabin the discretion of those engaged in con struction of abstract provisions by appealing to the specific intentions of those who either wrote or ratified them. This version of originalism has been 10. I of f er elsewhere such a quantitative assessment of the meaning of the words "commerce" and "regulate." Randy E. Barnett Such a quantitative survey is not always possible, however, given the state of the evidence of the particular word at issue. For example, the term "necessary" i s too common to establish by quantitative survey a dominant public meaning to which the Necessary and Proper Clause must have refeHed. One must then fall back on more traditi onal reliance on statements of various participants in the historical period about the clause in question. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183 (ZOO3) (analyzing statements made by Madison, Hamilton, Jcfferson, Marshall, and others for evidence of the original meaning of the words "necessa ry" and "proper").
I I. On the distinction between interpretation and construction, see BARNElT, supra note 9, at 118-30. meaning or intent (it is not always clear which) to discern the principles un derlying the text, and then purport to "translate" those principles-but not the text itself-into the modem day context.11 While this does not sound like the method that the authors endorse, nor practice in most cases, they nevertheless cite Lany Lessig's work with approval without seeming to appreciate the difference between his approach and that of other originalists.18
As I said. their discussion of methodology is confusing, but perhaps no more so than the well-known historian Jack Rakove, a nonoriginalist. whose discussion of interpretive methodology the authors say they found heipful.19 12. Seeid. at 89-91, 113-16.
13. UVTLLER& MERKEL. supra nOli:: I, a1148, 154,296 n,6, 299 n.36.
14. See, e.g., id. at 98 ("By inference, as well as from the record of debate in the House, the process casts light on the Amendment's intended meaning.").
15. See Uviller and Merkel seem not to realize that original ism has quite differing and competing strains or, if they do, they do not consistently keep within one method or another. Their erratic methodology renders it hard to respond to their interpretive claims since they might, for example, present evidence of intent that, while valid as far as it goes, is irrelevant to the public meaning of the text or, at a minimum, is not dispositive.
As it tums out, the obvious source of this confusion siems from the fact that the authors are not themselves originalists, although they never disclose this to the reader.20 They therefore fall into the large class of no norigina lists who make originalist arguments, one assumes, to persuade others who care more about original meaning than they do. This probably describes every opponent of the individual-rights interpretation of the Second Amendment who offers historical evidence that this interpretation is in error.21 Even the professional historians who insist on a crabbed originalist interpretation of the right to bear arms, a right of which they disapprove, would never think to apply this method to limit other constitutional rights that they Iike.22
If, however, as the authors themselves believe, courts need not and often should not follow original meaning, then courts are perfectly free to adopt a robust individual-rights interpretation of the Second Amendment even if this should contradict its original meaning. Uvilter and Merkel do not, of course, consider this implication of rejecting originalism.
So far as I could tell, the authors present no new cvidence of the original meaning of the Second Amendment and confine themselves to reliance on 20. I learned for the first time that they are not originalists during their talks at the symposium on their book held at the Willi am & Mary School of Law. Until that moment, I had assumed from the book that they were. I was perhaps misled by their statement near the beginning of the book that: "Our historical approach is simply this: we take seriously the words chosen by the drafters, and seek their meaning to the ratifying generation." Id. at 37. Perhaps like other readers, I took this to describe their approach to constitutional interpretation.
21.
See , e.g., Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History o/the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 309, 369, 362-69 (1998) (arguing that "Madison's objecti ve in writing the Second Amendment was not to grant an individual right but to set limits on congressional power"); Keith A.
Erhman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: HUII e You Seen Your Mi l itio Lotely?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5, 24, 18-24 (1989) (concluding that Min the cOntellt of the Constitution, the militia was viewed as a state-organized, state-run body" and that "(t]his distinction between the militia as a state-organized body and as the entire citizenry at large is important in understanding the Second Amendment because one of the central clai m s of those who oppose government ef f ons to regulate firearms is that the 'militia' referred to in the Constitution simply means an armed citizenry at large"). secondary sources or evidence already well-known to Second Amendment scholars of all stripes. There is nothing wrong with offering a new interpre tation of previously discussed evidence, of course, but readers should not expect to find anything that has not been previously considered by other writers in the field. Nothing new has been uncovered to change the debate.
And unfortunately for a book-length work, the authors do not treat compre hensively all the available evidence of original meaning. This is particularly regrettable as the quantity of such historical evidence is manageable enough that all of it could have been evaluated in the space of a monograph.
Let me tum now from generalities to particulars, for it will come as no surprise to those familiar with my writings in this area23 to learn that I am not persuaded by the authors' originalist arguments and therefore disagree with their conclusions. Because most of the book is taken up by a lengthy, and largely uncontroversial, history of the militia before and after the adoption of the Constitution, along with a discussion of classical republicanism, the book's treatment of the Second Amendment is actually rather briee4 Their conclusion that the individual right to anns is conditioned on service in an organized militia rests on a few claims that I shall treat separately.
First is the claim that "bear anns" had an exclusively military connotation. Second, that, as a textual matter, the first part of the amendment places a condition on the exercise of the right specified in the second part .2S
Third, that the "Privileges or Immunities" of the Fourteenth Amendment do not include the protection of an individual non-militia-based right to keep and bear anns?6 Fourth, that the practical significance of finding the right to bear anns to be an unconditional individual right is to protect an absolute right to be fr ee of any regulation whatsoever , no matter how reasonable.
Though this last claim hardly seems relevant to the authors' historical claims, they repeat it in sometimes intemperate tones throughout the work. 37. The New Oxford English Dictionary defines "mass noun" as "a noun denoting something that cannot be counted (e.g., a substance or quality), in English usually a noun that lacks a plural in ordinary usage and is not used with the indefinite anicle, e.g., luggage, china, happiness.
Conb'aSted with COUNT NOUN." NEW OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1051 (2001).
38. Another such gmmmatical fallacy is the claim that "commerce" in the Commerce Clause had a narrow meaning excluding manufacturing because you would not speak of manufacturing among the several states. But this awkwardness is caused by the meaning of "among the several states" that limits the type of acl i vities to those that could be conducted across state lines. Though it is true that the original meaning of "commerce" did exclude manufacturing, this is established by direct evidence of usage and the gnunmatical awkwardness of substituting "manufacturing" for "commerce" in the Commerce Clause tells us nothing about its original meaning. Barnett If, for example, congress were to pass a law prohibitin g any person from bearin g arms, as a means of preventing insurrec tions, the judicial courts, under the construction of the words necessary and proper, here contended for, would be able to pronounce decidedly upon the constitutionality of these means. But if congress may use any means, which they choose to adopt, the provision in the constitution which secures to the people the right of bearing arms, is a mere nullity; and any man imprisoned fo r bearin g arms under such an act, might be without relief; because in that case, no court could have any power to pronounce on the necessity or propriety of the means adopted by congress to carry any specified power into complete effect. 42
Tucker here is clearly discussing an individual right to keep and bear anns outside of any militia context, and he ignores entirely the preface to the Amendment.
Another important counterexample to their thesis that "bear aons" had an exclusively military meaning, one that the authors do discuss, is the rec ommendation of the minority report of the Pennsylvania ratification convention that the Constitution be amended to include the following:
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and their own State, or the United States, or fo r the purpose of killing game; and no law shall be passed for disanning the people or any of them, unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals; and as standing armies in the time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; and that the military shall be kept under strict subordination to and governed by the civil power. 43
The authors readily concede that this proposal clearly uses "bear anns"
to include both nonmilitary ("defense of themselves," "for the purpose of killing game") and military ("and their own State") contexts, thus 4 L The omission is curious as Tucker is discussed in articles cited and criticized by Uviller and Merkel. They would have had to have skipped over this source in one article they discuss to reach the quotation from the later treatise by Joseph Story, the treatment of which they chose to discuss at some length. See In fa irness then, the Pennsylvania dissenters can hardly be
... as the rambling catch-all compendium of one man bent on scuttling ratification" S4 without some evidence that this was so.
Nor was the Pennsylvania minority alone in attempting to amend the Constitution to protect an individual right to arms not conditioned on militia service. Included in the minority recommendation of the Massachusetts con vention was this proposed amendment:
[The) Constitution be never construed ... to prevent the people of the Un ited States, who are peaceable citi zens, from keeping their own arms; or to raise standing annies, unless when necessary for the defence of the United States, or of some one or more of them; or to prevent the people from petitioning, in a peaceable and orderly manner, the federal legislature. for a redress of grievances; or to subject the people to unreasonable searches and seizures of their . " persons, papers or possessions.
(1894). The first state convention to append proposed amendments was Massachusetts--tbe sixth state to ratify-which voted for ratification on February 6, 1788. Jd. at 93-96. After Massachusetts, all of the remaining seven states except Maryland proposed amendments to the Constitution along with theif vote to ratify. Jd at 97. These proposals can also be accessed online from the Avalon Project at Yale Law School, at http://www .yale.edullawwebiavalon/ 18th.htm (click on "Ralification of the Consri tution" fOf an individual stale) (last visited Oct. 17, 2(04). As in Pennsylvania, this proposal does not explicitly mention the militia.
The right to keep arms appears among a list of purely individual rights, none of which are in any way conditioned upon service in the militia.
In addition, the New Hampshire ratification convention officially proposed that the Constitution be amended to read that "Congress shall never disann any arms by the phrase "for their common defence," ? and the court places great stress on this language in the passage quoted by Uviller and Merkel. 7 7 As the authors acknowledge elsewhere, 's this language suggests a more military or mutual defense meaning. In contrast to the language of the Tennessee constitution, however, the U.S. Senate rejected a proposal to add the qualifier "for the common defence" to the language of the Second Amendment. 7 9 While the authors dismiss the significance of the Senate's refusal on the ground that this quali fying language was redundant,SO their assertion requires independent proof that the unqualified right is already limited to uses of arms for the common defense and does not also include the use of arms by the people in defense of themselves, as several state constitutions specified. In other words, only if you assume that you have established the meaning of the right to keep and bear arms can you contend that this additional language was superfluous.
Equally if not more plausible is the inference that the qualifying language might well have been rejected because it unduly narrowed the scope of the right. In the absence of any recorded debate, we just do not know.
B. Evidence That the Right "to Keep " Arms is Not Mi litary
To determine original meaning, as opposed to original intent, the cryptic and unreported Senate deliberations are far less important than the existence of state constitutional right-la-arms guarantees that included the broader "defence of themselves" language. A member of the public in 1791 reading the Second Amendment would likely not assume that the unqualified right in the Amendment actually meant something narrower than the broad right to anns for both personal and collective self defense that was already protected by some state constitutions.
Take, fo r example, the reaction to Madison's proposed amendments by Samuel Nasson, an Antifederalist representative to the Massachusetts ratifi cation convention held the previous year. In a letter to George Thatcher, a Federalist congressman from Massachusetts, Nasson wrote: I find that Ammendments [sic] are once again on the Carpet . I hope that such may take place as will be for the Best Interest of the whole. A Bill of rights well secured that we the people may know how far we may Proceade in Every Department then their will be no Dispute Between the people and rulers in that may be secured the right to keep anns fo r Common and Extraordinary Occations such as to secure ourselves against the wild Beast and also to amuse us by fo wling and for our Defence against a Conunon Enemy . . .. Sl Nasson then goes on to extol the virtue of popular resistance to a "foreign fo e" and condemn standing annies in times ofpeace. 82 Notwithstanding his concern for the common defense, Nasson nevertheless reads the right to keep arms in the Second Amendment as also a personal one, unconnected with militia service. 83 Note also, that Nasson uses "arms" for hunting, in contrast with Garry Wills's assertions . 84 This quote goes unmentioned by Uviller and Merkel, though it appears in the Fifth Circuit's opinion in United Slates v. Emerson, ss an opinion that they much discuss and disparage. 86 Instead of letting readers make up thei r own minds about such contemporary statements, this highly inconvenient Perhaps because the Second Amendment literature had not previously discussed the Nasson and Belknap statements, Wills fails to consider them in his exposition on the meaning of "to keep. , , 92 The best counterexample that he can produce is a statement in which John Trenchard "advised that 'a competent number of them [firelocks] be kept in every parish for the young men to exercise with on holidays. " , 93 That "kept" can be used in a military context, however, does not give the word itself a military connotation. "Truck" can be used in a military context too, but that does not make the word itself military, much less exclusively military. That arms can be "kept" in an armory, as of course they can, does not mean that they cannot also be "kept" at home. 94 Wills concludes: "To separate one tenn from this context and treat it as specifying a different right (of home possession) is to impart into the lan guage something fo reign to each tenn in itself, to the conjunction of tenns, and to the entire context of Madison's sentence.
, , 95 But given his lack of evidence, Wills's argument concerning "to keep" must really boil down to his tenuous claim that "bear anns" is exclusively military and therefore "to keep" must be military when conjoined with it. With Nasson, Belknap , and the authors of the Massachusetts minority report, however, we have actual members ofthe public at the fo unding referencing the right to keep arms and describing it as a nonmilitary right. Appeals to "context" cannot silence 92. It is typical in this debate for the individual-rights scholars to produce direct evidence of usage, which thei r opponents then attempt to shoot down, usually by assening some larger "context," rather than producing new direct evidence of their own. These statements-like others relied upon by individual-rights scholars that I do not reiterate here 9 6---are direct evidence of what the public thought the Second Amendment phrase "the right to keep and bear anns" meant. Unlike the authorities relied upon by Uviller and Merkel (or Wills), they are not statements merely evincing a concern for the militia, from which we are supposed to circumstantially infer what the "right to keep and bear arms" might have meant. These statements evidence what the specific words of the Second Amendment objectively manifested to real people. The dirty little secret of this long-running debate is that only one side has produced any con crete examples of actual statements from the fo unding era expressing that side's interpretation of the right to keep and bear arms and the Second Amendment.
C. Evidence That to "Bear Arms " Me ant to Carry Anns Several times the authors assert, once again without evidence, that the term "bear arms" was chosen because it did not connote the mere carrying of guns. "In late-eighteenth-century parlance, bearing arms was a term of art with an obvious military and legal connotation. 'Carrying a gun' lacks the implication of bearing anns and, of course, the Constitution nowhere men tions a 'right to carry a gun., ,, 97 The 1785 edition of Samuel Johnson's A Dictionary of the English Language repeatedly defines "bear" as "carry. , ,98 After describing "bear" as a "word used with such latitude, that it is not eas ily explained," the dictionary lists its first meaning as "To carry as a burden, " fo llowed immediately by "To convey or carry," "To carry as a mark of authority, " "To carry as a mark of distinction," "To carry as in show," "To 96. For a useful compendium of examples, see Emerson, 270 F.3d at 236-59. Those who oppose the individual-rights interprelation love to deride the reiteration of the same examples, as though examples of usage wear out from overuse. See. e.g., Wills, To Keep ond Bear Arms, supra note 30, at 65 (noting that "Slandilrd Modelers" refer "again and again" to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention's minority VOle to place killing game among the objects of a right to bear arms).
In contraSt, they offer no examples of fo unding-era views regarding Ihe Second Amendment, or the right 10 keep and bear anns, that conespond to the view that they claim everyone held. E.g., UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, al 109 ("To the ratifiers, the right to keep and bear arms was inextricably and exclusively bound to the maintenance of a mi litia .... "). Instead, they use "context" to explain away and trump the contrary evidence. When it comes to historical evidence, however, you cannol beal something with nothing.
97. UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 26-27; see also id. at 149 ("The righl to anTIS is declared by the verbs, 'keep and bear, ' a phrase carefully selected in preference to alternatives such as 'have,' 'own,' 'carry,' or 'possess."1. The authors offer no independenl evidence as to the "care" thai went into this verbal choice. See id. The argument that the phrase "keep and bear" must have been carefully chosen instead of these other words that connote a different meaning assumes a fact that must be shown: that these other words would indeed have connoted a different meaning. of Rights, including the rights of assembly and to keep and bear arms, applies only to fe deral, and not state, exercises of power.I07 Although today we protect such liberties (a historically and incompletely) by "incorporating" them into the Due Process Clause, the protection of the right to arms against infringement by the states, as I discuss below in Part IV, is more properly included within the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 08 Clearly. however. if the later doctrine of incorporation properly applies to the right of assembly, it can just as easily apply to the right to anns, Crnikshank notwithstanding.
I SAMUEL
Some might object to the relevance of all the nineteenth-century cases that I have discussed for establishing original meaning of an amendment en acted in 1791, and 1 sympathize with the objection. The fa nher in time that one gets from promulgation, the less germane is the evidence of public meaning. 1 offer these cases because nineteenth-century cases are discussed at length by the authors in their opening chapterlO9 and because they concede that these cases interpreting the language "in defence of themselves and the state" represent the antithesis of their view. llo This in tum is relevant to the meaning of the same language used at the fo unding in right-to-arms provi sions in the state constitutions discussed above.
III
Also, more recent cases are useful to establish the late development of a collective or states-rights view of the amendment-a view unknown at the foun ding and correctly rejected by the authors.11 2 Finally, Taney's opinion in Dred Scott refutes the authors' suggestion that the Supreme Court has never considered the Second Amendment to protect an individual right uncondi tioned on militia service. II) In this, its earliest known mention of the Amendment, the Court clearly did.
D. Was "defence of themselves " Also Ex clusively Mi litary?
Before moving on to the next problem with Uviller and Merkel's originalist argument, let me briefly consider a different militia-conditioned interpretation of "for the defence of themselves and the state" that they do not offer. As we just saw, Uviller and Merkel concede that the wording of the Pennsylvania minority report included a personal right to bear arms outside the militia context. 1 14 That is why they go to such lengths to marginalize these speakers. Olhers, however, might claim that the phrase "for the defence of themselves" was the equivalent of "for the defence oflhe community," a right that also was to be exercised solely in the context oflhe militia.
Here is a brieflist oflhe problems with that claim: (I) First, and most importantly, r am aware of no direct evidence of anyone at the time of the fo unding asserting that "in defence of themselves" means "for the defence oflhe community."
(2) As a textual matter. "in defence of themselves" seems most obviously to be simply the plural of the personal right of self defense, a usage that was appropriate given that the subject of the right is the plural tenn "the people." In other words, if the drafters wanted to use the tenn "the people" as they had in other amendments, and "the people" is the plural of individual person, how else would the right to bear anns for personal self defense be protected besides making the second tenn "themselves"? A drafter would not write "himselves" or "him or herselves." (3) Indeed, this same grammatical choice is made in the Fourth Amendment, which refers to the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects . . " .',II S SO here "the people" is being used as the plural of individual person, as reflected in the use of the word "their"-just like the use of "themselves" in state constitutions. Similarly, the English Bill of Ri ghts refers to the ri�ht of individual protestant "Subjects" to "have AnTIs for their Defence." 1 6 There is no difference in meaning between "their defence" and "in defence of themselves." (4) It is true that the fo unders used "no rerson" and "any person" in the Fifth Amendment to refer to individuals, 1 7 but this is a grammatical consequence of shifting from affinning that everyone has a particular right to a claim about particular individuals not being denied a right. In the absence of direct and compelling historical evidence to the contrary, nothing in the public meaning would tum on this grammatical flip between the Fourth Amendment, on the one hand, and the First, Second, and Fift h Amendments on the other.
(5) Consider this language fr om the very same 1776 Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights in which the "in defence of themselves" language appears: (describing the legislative history of this fo rmulation, which lacked any mililia preface or condition).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Did the use of the tenn "themselves" imply that the reference here is to "the community" rather than to individual rights? Hardly. The last portion of this statute refutes any such suggestion. Nearly identical language appears in the 1777 Vermont Constitution.1 I 9 Other state constitutional protections from unreasonable searches refer to "every subject" with no apparent difference in meaning.120
Or consider this passage from the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution: "that the judges of the supreme judicial court should hold their offices as long as they behave themselves well; and that they should have honorable salaries ascertained and established by standing laws." 121 (6) As I have already discussed, language expressing "in defence of the community" was readily available and in use in, for example, the Massachusetts Constitution, which referred to "a right to keep and bear arms for the common defense"l22--qualifying language that was proposed and rejected in the Senate as an amendment to the Second Amendment.123 (7) Finally, this interpretation of "in defence of themselves" leads to a bizarre interpretation of the Pennsylvania minority report itself that Uviller and Merkel, and others, claim to be a pure (and radical, exceptional, and rejected) statement of individual rights. By this interpretation, even the Pennsylvania dissenters did not seek to protect an individual right of self defense! We would be asked to believe that they sought instead to protect the right to defend the community ("in defence of themselves"), the right to defend the state ("and their own state"-notice the use of the word "their,"
by the way, as in the Fourth Amendment), and the right to kill game, but not the right to anns for personal self defense. This interpretation would not 118. PA Why not? Because if only military matters were under discussion when arms were mentioned in Congress during this period, then it fo llows from this fa ct-and not from any exclusive meaning of the phrase "bear arms"-that all uses of the phrase "bear anns" during this period in this database would necessarily be military.
To test this proposition, I searched for phrases that Uviller and Merkel might concede have nonmilitary connotations, like "carry arms," "possess anns," and "have arms" and found just one nonmilitary result.110 Significantly, I also found no references at all in this database to "keep arms," other than one (garbled) reference to the Second Amendment.lli This finding further suggests both (I) that the discussions involving "anns" in this database during this period were exclusively about military matters, such that we would expect "bear anns" to be used only in its military sense, and (2) that "keep anns" did not have a commonly employed military connotation. m Professor Yassky's findings should not be surprising. Given the nar rowly interpreted powers of Congress during the era that he surveyed, 1774-1821, it is hardly unexpected that congressional debates would be discussing arms only in a military context. Congress had neither the inclination nor the power to propose laws that would have affected the personal right to keep or bear arms outside the militia context. Besides, it was constitutionally barred fr om doing so by the Second Amendment.
Furthermore, since Professor Yassky did his search, the Library of Congress extended its database to the year 1875, covering the tumultuous years before, during, and after the Civil War, when the personal, nonmilitary rights of blacks and others to keep and bear arms were perceived as threat ened fr om a variety of sources. Sure enough, four examples of the word "bear arms" from this era appear to refer to a personal right outside the con text of the militia.133 Each of the fo llowing examples substantiates the proposition that, when Congress was discussing nonmilitary matters that 131. A second reference in this debate to "keep anns" purponedly appears in the right to anns provision of the Constituti on of the Confederate States of America, .but is actually a mistranscription of the original, which is also available for comparison on the relevant page.
132. I do nOI claim that "keep arms" could never be used in a military context, bUllhat any such uses are rare and there are clear instances-for example, the Nassan and Belknap statements quoled above--o f "keep anns" referring to an individual right wholly apart from any active service in an and others it caused to be brought before courts created by itself, and to be tried and punished without law, in vi olation of the constitutional guarantee to the citi zen of his right to keep and bear arms, and of his 134. H.R. J., 34th Cong., lSI Scss . 1126 (1856) (emphasis added).
135. H.R. J., 37th Cong., lSI Sess. 102 (1861) (emphasis added). True, all these nonmilitary uses of "bear arms" occurred long after the founding, but any assertion that the meaning of "bear anns" had changed at some unspecified interval assumes what must be proved: that the phrase "bear arms" had at the founding an exclusively military meaning-especially when conjoined with a right to keep anns-that was subsequently broadened to include nonmilitary usages as well. Evidence that such a change occurred is nonexistent.
In this regard, it bears rcpeating that neither the authors nor Garry Wills present a single example of any person from the fo unding era or immediately thereaft er who suggested that the right to "keep and bear arms" was exclusively a military right. While there are numerous examples of the right being used more broadly, such as the statements by Nasson and Belknap quoted above, 140 there is no record of anyone at the time asserting that the right in the Second Amendment was as narrow or conditioned as the authors claim. Three types of statements could directly support their empirical claim that the original meaning of the right to keep and bear arms was exclusively a military one:
(a) A statement opining that the right to keep and bear arms in the Second Amendment is conditioned on the continued existence of an organized militia; and (b) A statement explicitly rejecting the importance of an individual right to keep and bear arms, independent of an organized militia; and 136. SEN. J., 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 53-54 (1864) (emphasis added). 137. President Ulysses S. Grant, Address Before Congress (Apr. 19, 1872) (emphasis added), in H.R. J., 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 716 (1872).
138. See infra nOles 160--73 and accompanying texl. 153. Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 793, 793-95 (1998) (explaining thaI these clauses "shed some light" on the Sewnd Amendment in that Ihey (I) show that the Second Amendment is fa irly tommonplate, rather than strikingly odd; (2) rebul the claim that a right expires once its justification expires; (3) show that operative clauses are often "both broader and narTOwer than their justification clauses,'" IlOt dependent on the right's furtherance of its justi fICation clause; and (4) '"'poinl to how the two clauses might be read together without disregarding either''). use of a semicolon, the nearly identical passage fr om the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 reads: "The Liberty of the Press is essential to the security of freedom in a State, it ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this Commonwealth. "ISS The authors note these state constitutions but dismiss this evidence on the sole ground that "the Second Amendment remains unique among the federal Bill of Rights." l S 6 But this misses the significance of Professor Volokh's justification-clause evidence for the original public meaning of the Second Amendment. These state-constitutional-rights provisions show that "to eighteenth century ears" (using the authors' phrase), 1 S7 such language was not uncommon and, so far as we know, was not elsewhere interpreted to limit or condition the right that fo llowed. The authors' denials notwithstanding, this evidence does indeed bear on the original public meaning of the Second Amendment.
None of this is to suggest that the authors' purely textualist analysis is absurd. To the contrary, it is the most plausible argument that the gun-rights opponents have raised to date because they finally concede that the right was one held by individuals and not by state governments.
ISS But neither is their analysis compelling. The fact that the right to bear and keep arms was not expressly conditioned on the Second Amendment's preface strongly suggests that it was not so conditioned. It is precisely when plausible doubts are raised about the proper interpretation of text that evidence of original public meaning becomes important. As we have seen, ample evidence exists to suggest that the right to keep and bear anus existed apart from active service in a militia for the common defense, and reasonable members of the public would have and did so read it. IS9 Even if Uviller and Merkel are correct that the right to keep and bear anns is conditioned on the continued existence of a general militia-of-the whole, this raises the question of whether they are also right to claim that such a militia no longer exists, a claim to which I shall return after briefly considering two other problems with their treatment.
IV. Was the Right to Keep and Bear Anus Among the Privileges or
Immunities of Citizens?
Whatever its proper scope, the right to keep and bear arms (like the rest of the Bill of Rights) was originally meant solely as a constraint on federal 173. 14 Stat. 176-77 (1866) (emphasis added). That the Act protected the right to bear anns solely from di scriminatory treatment does not detract from the conclusion that the right is clearly among the privileges or immunities protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. As Curtis has explained, the Amendment protects the right both fr om laws that discriminate among the people and from laws that abridge equally the privileges or immunities of all citizens. See One suspects that they omit this fa ct about other individual-rights scholars-whom they never call "scholars," much less "respected"-so they There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be Notwithstanding all the evidence presented above, suppose Uviller and Merkel are correct in their claim that the right to keep and bear anns in the Second Amendment was somehow conditioned on service in the militia. Even were this true, their case would still depend on whether the "militia," properly defined. no longer exists. Therefore, Uviller and Merkel's next most important claim after their assertion that the right to bear anns is condi tioned on the continued existence of the militia, is that the militia has been discontinued and thus the Second Amendment has fa llen silent:
[W]ith no contemporary descendent to inherit the Framers' concept of a republican militia, the incidental right of citizens to bear and to keep the arms necessary to the life of such a militia has atrophied; it has simply fa llen silent in the midst of the tumultuous debate on the issue in today's world. 206
How then do they define the term "militia"?
As we have recounted-and as all scholars agree-the fo unding generation of Americans conceived of a militia as a group composed of all fr ee white males between eighteen and fo rty·five (except for the conscientious objectors and others entitled to an exemption), responding willingly, as needed, for the common defence, at the call of local authority, and above all, as a viable alternative to the feared standing army . 207
Now it is possible to quarrel with this definition. At the end, for example, the authors seem to build into the definition of militia that "above all" it must be a "viable alternative" to a standing army, suggesting that if an entity is not a viable alternative then it is not truly a "militia." Ifby "viable alternative" the authors have in mind something like an "effective substitute," they cannot mean this seriously. Such a definition runs afoul of the Constitution itself, which affirms both the existence of the militia and the power to create a standing army, as necessary for national defense.
2os In the As for today's militia, they write:
In the years since World War Ii, the role of a mass reserve in assuring national security has seriously diminished in consideration of the technical complexity of equipment and tasks required of a thoroughly professional modem anny, and because nuclear deterrence has made a mass war drawing on all the personnel reserve of the country unlikely.
The need for a whole nation in anns has-in all likelihood, pennanently---disappeared. 224
"Indeed," they confidently assert, "it would be difficult to conceive of any 230. NAT'L COMM'NON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON TIlE U.S., supra note 226, at 13. Lesi l be misunderslood, I do not offer Ihis example 10 suggeSI that ai rplane passengers should be anned or that a proper interpretation of the Second Amendment would make disarming them unconstitutional. I offer it only 10 show that Uviller and Merkel are wrong 10 ass ert that, because the nature of warfare has changed, the militia-of-the-whole i s no longer, and will never again be, needed to assist in providing for the common defense of the United States. At the least, reasonable people can disagree with their claim. 
